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Abstract
A sensor network key distribution scheme for hierarchical sensor networks was recently pro-
posed by Cheng and Agrawal. A feature of their scheme is that pairwise keys exist between
any pair of high-level nodes (which are called cluster heads) and between any (low-level) sensor
node and the nearest cluster head. We present two attacks on their scheme. The ﬁrst attack
can be applied for certain parameter sets. If it is applicable, then this attack can result in the
compromise of most if not all of the sensor node keys after a small number of cluster heads are
compromised. The second attack can always be applied, though it is weaker.
1 Introduction
There has been considerable recent interest in sensor networks that have a hierarchical architecture.
A commonly-studied model (see, for example, [10, 5]) is to assume the existence of a powerful base
station, a number of m high-level nodes (called cluster heads) and a larger number, n, of (low level)
sensor nodes. Typical values for these parameters are n = 10000 and m = 100.
After deployment, any two cluster heads are assumed to be able to communicate directly. A
sensor node is only required to communicate with the nearest cluster head. It is assumed that these
communications can all be done directly (no intermediate nodes required). It is also assumed that
n/m sensor nodes are deployed in the vicinity of each cluster head. Additional details of this model
can be found in [10, 5].
It is not assumed that cluster heads are tamperproof, and therefore there is the possibility that
cluster heads might be compromised. The attack model is the standard “node capture” model.
The adversary can observe all communications that take place between nodes in the network, and
the adversary can capture a number of nodes and extract all the keys that are stored in them. We
will mainly focus on a special attack where the adversary compromises s out of the m cluster heads.
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1There have been many proposals for key distribution protocols for sensor networks. See [3, 4, 7,
9, 12, 13] for several diﬀerent approaches to this problem. The special case of hierarchical networks
has also received considerable attention, and key distribution schemes for hierarchical networks
have been presented in [5, 6, 8, 10, 14, 15, 17, 18].
In this paper, we present an attack on the scheme proposed by Cheng and Agrawal [5]. This
scheme can be viewed as a generalization of a well-known scheme due to Jolly, Kuscu, Kokate
and Younis ([10]). A main motivation for the Jolly-Kuscu-Kokate-Younis scheme is the low energy
consumption overhead. Cheng and Agrawal’s modiﬁcation is intended to provide enhanced security,
even when cluster heads are not assumed to be tamperproof and they can be compromised by an
adversary.
First, we summarize how the Cheng-Agrawal scheme works. Denote the cluster heads by
C1,...,Cm and the sensor nodes by S1,...,Sn. [5] assumes that there is a predeployed pair-
wise key between the base station and every other node (a pairwise key is a key that is held by
exactly two nodes). The main objective of [5] is to describe how pairwise keys are created between
• any two cluster heads (we call these cluster head keys), and
• any sensor node and the closest cluster head (we will refer to these keys as sensor node keys).
The ﬁrst objective is accomplished by using a Blom Scheme [1, 2]. We brieﬂy summarize the
construction of a t-resilient Blom Key Predistribution Scheme as it would be applied in the context
of setting up pairwise keys for the m cluster heads. In what follows, we assume for simplicity that
the IDs of the m cluster heads are 1,...,m, respectively. We will denote by KC
i,j the cluster head
key that is held by Ci and Cj. Here is the Blom Scheme:
step 1 A prime number p is chosen, and for 0 ≤ i,j ≤ t, random elements ai,j ∈ Zp are chosen
such that ai,j = aj,i for all i,j. Then deﬁne the polynomial
f(x,y) =
t X
i=0
t X
j=0
ai,j xiyj mod p.
step 2 For each cluster head Cr, deﬁne the polynomial
gCr(x) = f(x,r) mod p =
t X
i=0
ar,i xi.
step 3 For each cluster head Cr, the coeﬃcient vector (ar,0,...,ar,t) ∈ (Zp)t+1 is stored in Cr.
step 4 For any two cluster heads Cr and Cs, the pairwise key is KC
r,s ∈ Zp is deﬁned to be
KC
r,s = f(r,s), where Cr computes
KC
r,s = gCr(s)
and Cs computes
KC
r,s = gCs(r).
2From well-known properties of the Blom Scheme (see, for example [16, Ch. 10]), it follows
that no set of t cluster heads can determine any information about the pairwise key of two other
cluster heads, but any set of t + 1 cluster heads can compute all the pairwise keys in the scheme.
In order to provide complete resilience of the cluster node keys against any compromise of other
cluster heads, it is suggested in [5] to set the resilience of the Blom Scheme (namely, t) to be
higher than the number of cluster nodes (which is denoted by m). However, in this situation, it
would be simpler and more eﬃcient (from the point of view of storage, see step 3) just to predeploy
independent pairwise keys between any two cluster heads, without using a Blom Scheme. However,
this modiﬁcation does not aﬀect the security of the scheme, nor does it aﬀect the attacks we will
describe.
The second objective is realized using an “improved key distribution mechanism” (IKDM)
described in [5, §3]. Each sensor node Si is given one key, say Ki, before deployment. Si is also
given a list of ℓ identiﬁers of cluster heads, say Bi ⊆ {1,...,m}. Ki is computed as the sum of ℓ
shares, each of which can be computed by one of the cluster heads identiﬁed in Bi (recall that the
number of cluster heads is m, so we assume that m ≥ ℓ).
Additional Blom Schemes are also used in the IKDM. In fact, a diﬀerent Blom scheme is
associated with each cluster head. However, the bivariate polynomials associated with any of these
Blom Schemes always have the ﬁrst variable set equal to the ID of that cluster head. So there
is no point in using bivariate polynomials for the cluster heads; it suﬃces for a diﬀerent degree t
univariate polynomial to be associated with each cluster head. These polynomials, which will have
coeﬃcients deﬁned over the ﬁnite ﬁeld Zp, will be termed CH-polynomials. The CH-polynomial
assigned to Cj will be denoted by gj(x).
Now, each share of a key Ki is computed by evaluating a CH-polynomial at the point i. To be
precise, Ki is deﬁned as follows:
Ki =
X
j∈Bi
gj(i), (1)
where the terms gj(i) are the shares of Ki. The shares and the keys are all elements of Zp.
After deployment, the following protocol is carried out so the nearest cluster head to Si, say
Cp, can learn the value of the key Ki.
step 1 Si sends the list Bi to Cp (it is possible, but not required that p ∈ Bi).
step 2 For every j ∈ Bi, j  = p, Cp obtains an encrypted share from Cj. That is, Cj computes
sj = eKC
j,p(gj(i)) and sends sj to Cp (observe that share sj is encrypted with the cluster head
key KC
j,p). If p ∈ Bi, then Cp computes the share gp(i) by itself.
step 3 Cp decrypts all the encrypted shares and computes the sum (1) to get Ki. Now Si and Cp
have a pairwise key.
The scheme in [10] is basically the case ℓ = 1 of the Cheng-Agrawal scheme. In this situation,
each sensor node key has only one share, namely the key itself.
The authors of [5] argue that because all the keys in their scheme are pairwise keys, the network
is resilient to node compromise (even when allowing compromise of cluster heads). They say “Even
if all the 100 cluster heads are compromised, none of the keys preloaded in the sensor nodes could
be compromised in the network”. However, this cannot be true, because the keys preloaded in the
sensor nodes can be computed from the information that is stored in the cluster heads. In fact,
3Das and Sengupta [6] observe that the compromise of s cluster heads, after the IKDM process has
terminated, will result in the compromise of 100s of the sensor node keys.
1.1 Our Contributions
We describe two attacks on the Cheng-Agrawal scheme in this paper. In Section 2, we present an
attack that we call the “interpolation attack”. In this attack, the compromise of a small number of
cluster heads (after the IKDM process is completed) can result in the compromise of all or almost
all of the sensor node keys in the network. The interpolation attack can possibly be thwarted by a
careful choice of the parameters of the scheme. However, we describe another attack in Section 3;
this attack is called the “reconstruction attack”. The reconstruction attack can always be applied,
though it is usually a weaker attack than the interpolation attack, in the sense that it will not
result in the compromise of all the keys in the network.
2 Interpolation Attack
Suppose an adversary records the communications that take place during the IKDM. Then the
adversary compromises s out of the m cluster heads (we will assume that s < m, because the
compromise of all m cluster heads clearly reveals all the sensor node keys). This allows the adver-
sary to decrypt all the messages that were sent to these s cluster heads during the IKDM. After
their decryption, the adversary has information pertaining to various CH-polynomials evaluated at
various points. If any CH-polynomial has been evaluated at at least t + 1 points, then the polyno-
mial can be reconstructed using Lagrange interpolation, e.g., as is done in Shamir secret sharing
(see, for example [16, Ch. 13]). So the adversary can potentially recover many CH-polynomials by
compromising a small number of cluster heads.
We now present an attack that we call the “interpolation attack”. The attack has two phases,
as follows:
Phase I
Capture s cluster heads and recover the keys stored in them. Use these keys to decrypt all the
encrypted shares sent to these s cluster heads during the IKDM process. Then interpolate
the obtained shares (using Lagrange interpolation) to recover CH-polynomials .
Phase II
Use the recovered CH-polynomials to compute sensor node keys.
2.1 Phase I of the Attack
In this section, we discuss phase I of the interpolation attack. Recall that each sensor node Si
contains a list Bi consisting of ℓ of the m cluster heads. This list is sent in the clear to a cluster
head, so it is known to the adversary. We assume each list is a random ℓ-subset (which we will
call a block) of the m points in the set {1,...,m} (i.e., cluster head IDs). By compromising s
cluster heads, the adversary gets sn/m such blocks. The average number of occurrences of a point
x ∈ {1,...,m} in the sn/m blocks is snℓ/m2.
4The idea of our attack is to compromise a suﬃcient number s of cluster heads so that the
average number of occurrences of a point in the sn/m blocks is 25% higher than t. To be concrete,
we suppose that we choose s so that the following holds:
snℓ
m2 = 1.25t, (2)
Because we require s < m and we also want (2) to be satisﬁed, it must be the case that ℓ > 1.25mt/n.
There is nothing “magic” about the choice of the constant 1.25 in (2). If this constant is made
larger, it would increase the success probability of our attack (but more cluster heads would be
have to be compromised). Smaller values of this constant would decrease the success probability.
Having chosen s so that (2) holds, we will argue that almost every point occurs more than
t times in the set of sn/m blocks when. This is proven by using a standard tail inequality for
binomial distributions, which can be found in [11, p. 502 ], for example.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose X1,...,XN are independent random variables such that Pr[Xi = 1] = p and
Pr[Xi = 0] = 1 − p for all i. Deﬁne X = X1 +     + XN. Then
Pr[X ≤ N(p − ǫ)] ≤ e−ǫ2N/(2p). (3)
Note that Np is the expected value of X, so this estimate gives an upper bound on the proba-
bility that X is somewhat below its expectation.
We will apply the inequality (3), setting N = sn/m, p = ℓ/m, and ǫ = .2ℓ/m. Simplifying and
using (2), we get
Pr[X ≤ t] ≤ e−.025t.
Deﬁne a point to be good if it occurs at least t + 1 times in s random ℓ-subsets of {1,...,m}.
We have shown that, if s = 1.25tm2/(nℓ), then any given point is good with probability at least
1.0 − e−.025t. By linearity of expectation, it follows that the expected number of good points is at
least m(1.0−e−.025t) under these assumptions. For each good point j, the adversary can reconstruct
the polynomial gj(x). Therefore, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2. Suppose the hierarchical sensor network has m cluster heads, n sensor nodes, each
sensor node is given ℓ random IDs of cluster heads, and sensor node keys are deﬁned using CH-
polynomials of degree t. If an adversary compromises s = 1.25tm2/(nℓ) cluster heads after the
IKDM process, then the expected number of CH-polynomials that can be reconstructed using the
interpolation attack is at least m(1.0 − e−.025t).
We present an example to illustrate the application of Theorem 2.2.
Example 2.1. The parameters suggested in [5] are m = 100, n = 10000 and t = 128. [5] does not
discuss appropriate values for ℓ except to say that “To achieve suﬃcient security, large ℓ is desired”
([5, p. 42]). In order to apply Theorem 2.2, we choose s = 160/ℓ. Then
Pr[X ≤ 128] ≤ e−3.2 ≈ .04076.
Therefore the interpolation attack recovers (on average) at least 96 of the 100 CH-polynomials by
compromising 160/ℓ cluster heads.
Note that phase I of the interpolation attack becomes easier as ℓ gets bigger. If ℓ = 10, then
we take s = 16; if ℓ = 20, then we take s = 8, etc. That is, as ℓ is increased, the number of
compromised cluster heads required by the attack decreases.
5In practice, the interpolation attack will probably work better than the estimates derived above
would indicate. This is because the inequality (2) overestimates the tail probability in the relevant
binomial distribution. For speciﬁed values of the parameters, it is a simple matter to compute the
tail probability exactly. This is illustrated in the next example.
Example 2.2. We use the same parameters as in the previous example: m = 100, n = 10000 and
t = 128. Then we can compute Pr[X ≤ 128] exactly using the following formula:
Pr[X ≤ 128] =
128 X
j=0
￿
100s
j
￿￿
ℓ
100
￿j ￿
1 −
ℓ
100
￿100s−j
. (4)
For example, when ℓ = 20 and s = 8, the formula (4) yields .00218, as compared to the estimate (3)
of .04076. When ℓ = 10 and s = 16, the exact value is about .00349, as compared to the estimate
of .04076. The expected number of reconstructable CH-polynomials in the interpolation attack is
100(1.0 − Pr[X ≤ 128]).
2.2 Phase II
Now we turn to the second phase of the interpolation attack. Suppose the adversary has recovered
r of the m CH-polynomials. Then the adversary can compute the key for a particular sensor node
if the block corresponding to that node is a subset of the r points corresponding to the recovered
polynomials. This probability is easily seen to be
￿r
ℓ
￿
￿m
ℓ
￿. (5)
The following theorem is an immediate consequence of (5).
Theorem 2.3. Suppose the hierarchical sensor network has m cluster heads, n sensor nodes, and
each sensor node is given ℓ random IDs of cluster heads. Suppose that r CH-polynomials are
reconstructed during phase I of the interpolation attack. Then the expected number of sensor node
keys that can be computed in phase II of the interpolation attack is
n
￿r
ℓ
￿
￿m
ℓ
￿ .
If r < m, then it is clear that there will (probably) be some keys that are not compromised. In
phase II of the interpolation attack, the number of uncompromised keys increases as ℓ increases.
However, it is very likely that phase I will recover all m of the CH-polynomials (i.e., r = m), in
which case all n sensor node keys can be compromised. We show some computations in the next
example.
Example 2.3. We use the same parameters as in the previous examples: m = 100, n = 10000 and
t = 128.
In Table 1, we determine the expected number of sensor node keys that can be compromised,
for ℓ = 10, 20 and 40, computed as a function of the number of CH-polynomials, denoted by r,
that are reconstructed during the ﬁrst phase of the attack. We also indicate the expected number
of reconstructed CH-polynomials when s = 160/ℓ cluster heads are compromised during phase I.
These values are computed using the formula (4), as in Example 2.2.
6Table 1: Expected number of sensor node keys that can be compromised
number of recovered CH-polynomials (r) ℓ = 10 ℓ = 20 ℓ = 40
expected value of r 99.65 99.78 99.94
95 5837 3193 725
96 6516 4033 1243
97 7265 5081 2116
98 8090 6383 3575
99 9000 8000 6000
100 10000 10000 10000
3 The Reconstruction Attack
We have already noted that the interpolation attack described in the previous section can be
mounted only when ℓ > 1.25mt/n. It is of interest to point out a weaker attack that can be carried
out for any values of the parameters. We call this the “reconstruction attack”. The interpolation
attack only used the information received by the compromised cluster heads. In the reconstruction
attack, we make use of the information transmitted by the compromised cluster heads.
As before, we assume that s of the m cluster heads are compromised after the IKDM process
has completed. We mentioned in Section 1 that [6] observed that the adversary can immediately
obtain the sn/m sensor node keys that are stored in the s compromised cluster heads. We say that
these sensor keys have been directly compromised.
In this section, we point out that some additional sensor node keys can be (possibly) be compro-
mise by reconstructing them from compromised shares. Let J = {j1,...,js} denote the set of IDs
of the s compromised cluster heads. Suppose Si is a sensor node whose nearest cluster head, say
Cp, has not been compromised (hence p  ∈ J). Suppose it happens that Bi ⊆ J. Then all ℓ shares
that were used to compute Ki were encrypted with cluster head keys that have been compromised.
Therefore the adversary can compute Ki. In this situation, we say that the sensor node key Ki has
been reconstructed.
Now, the probability that Bi ⊆ J is ￿s
ℓ
￿
￿m
ℓ
￿.
There are n − sn/m = n(m −s)/m sensor nodes whose nearest cluster head has not been compro-
mised. Therefore, the expected number of reconstructed sensor node keys is
n(m − s)
￿s
ℓ
￿
m
￿m
ℓ
￿ .
The following theorem is now obvious.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose the hierarchical sensor network has m cluster heads, n sensor nodes,
and each sensor node is given ℓ random IDs of cluster heads. Suppose that s cluster heads are
compromised. Then the expected number of sensor node keys that can be compromised as a result
of a reconstruction attack is
n
m
 
s +
(m − s)
￿s
ℓ
￿
￿m
ℓ
￿
!
. (6)
7When we set ℓ = 1 and simplify (6), the total number of compromised sensor node keys is
sn
m
￿
2 −
s
m
￿
. (7)
Remark: Because the scheme in [10] is essentially the case ℓ = 1 of the Cheng-Agrawal scheme, it
follows that this attack can also be applied to the scheme in [10].
Example 3.1. Suppose that n = 10000, m = 100 and t = 160. The interpolation attack is
applicable only if ℓ > 2, However, when ℓ = 1 or 2, then we can use the reconstruction attack.
From (7), the expected number of compromised sensor node keys when ℓ = 1 is 100s(2−s/100).
If s = 10, for example, then we expect to compromise 1900 sensor node keys. That is, compromising
10% of the cluster heads results in 19% of the sensor node keys being compromised.
When ℓ = 2, the expected number of compromised sensor node keys can be computed from (6);
it is 100s + (100 − s)s(s −1)/99. If we again take s = 10, then we expect to be able to compromise
1082 sensor node keys. So compromising 10% of the cluster heads results in 10.8% of the sensor
node keys being compromised.
3.1 Analysis
The interpolation and reconstruction attacks can be mitigated by a careful choice of parameters.
It is clear from Example 3.1 that the reconstruction attack is much less eﬀective when ℓ ≥ 2 than
it is when ℓ = 1. So an appropriate strategy might be to choose ℓ = 2 and t = 1.6n/m. This would
prevent the interpolation attack from being applied.
To measure the eﬀectiveness of the reconstruction attack when ℓ = 2, we consider the ratio of
the number of reconstructed sensor node keys to the number of directly compromised sensor node
keys. This ratio is easily computed to be
(m − s)(s − 1)
m(m − 1)
.
This ratio is maximized by setting s = (m + 1)/2, in which case the ratio is approximately 1/4.
For this value of s, about n/2 sensor node keys are directly compromised, and an additional n/8
sensor node keys (approximately) are reconstructed.
4 Conclusion
In the communication model studied in [5], each sensor node communicates with only one cluster
head. This has the advantage that sensor nodes do not have to communicate with each other.
However, an unavoidable consequence is that the compromise of s cluster heads will result in the
compromise of sn/m sensor node keys. Therefore the best we can hope for is to ensure that no
additional sensor node keys are compromised.
There is a straightforward way to ensure this if cluster heads are permitted to communicate
with the base station during the key establishment phase. Each sensor node Si will send its ID to
the nearest cluster head. Then the cluster head forwards the sensor node ID to the base station
and the base station encrypts the key Ki and sends it to the cluster head. Finally, the cluster head
decrypts Ki.
8This approach might not be acceptable in some application scenarios. For example, the base
station might not be available during the key establishment phase for some reason. In such a
situation, we would be required to use a protocol where cluster heads communicate with each
other, such as the Cheng-Agrawal scheme. If this scheme is to be used, then it is important to
choose parameters in such a way that the consequences of the possible attacks are minimized. Our
suggestion is to divide each key into only two shares. This provides a good level of security under
appropriate parameter choices and it also requires lower communication complexity than if keys
are split into larger number of shares.
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